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ABSTRACT
Operationalizing machine learning based security detections is ex-
tremely challenging, especially in a continuously evolving cloud
environment. Conventional anomaly detection does not produce
satisfactory results for analysts that are investigating security in-
cidents in the cloud. Model evaluation alone presents its own set
of problems due to a lack of benchmark datasets. When deploying
these detections, we must deal with model compliance, localization,
and data silo issues, among many others. We pose the problem of
“aack disruption” as a way forward in the security data science
space. In this paper, we describe the framework, challenges, and
open questions surrounding the successful operationalization of
machine learning based security detections in a cloud environment
and provide some insights on how we have addressed them.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e increasing prevalence of cybersecurity aacks has created an
imperative for companies to invest in eective tools and techniques
for detecting such aacks. Intrusion detection systems are expected
[28] to grow to USD 5.93 billion by 2021 at a compound annual
growth rate of 12%.
Academia [8, 17, 29] and industry have long focused on building
security detection systems (shortened hereaer as detection) for
traditional, static, on-premise networks (also called “bare metal”)
while research in employing machine learning for cloud seing
is more nascent [20, 24, 26]. Whether detection systems for bare
metal or for the cloud, the emphasis is almost always on the algo-
rithmic machinery. is paper takes a dierent approach - instead
of detailing a single algorithm or technique that may or may not
be applicable depending on factors like volume of data, velocity
of operation (batch, near real time, real time), and availability of
labels, we document the challenges and open questions in building
machine learning based detection systems for the cloud. In this
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spirit, this paper is more closely related to [27] but very specic to
building monitoring systems for the cloud’s backend infrastructure.
We report the lessons learned in securing Microso Azure which
depends on more than 300 dierent backend infrastructure services
to ensure correct functionality. ese 300+ services support all
avors of cloud oerings: public cloud (accessible by all customers)
and private cloud (implementation of cloud technology within an or-
ganization). Within these cloud oerings, the backend services also
support dierent customer needs like Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS). Azure backend infrastruc-
ture generates more than tens of petabytes of log data per year
which has a direct impact on building machine learning based in-
trusion detection systems. In this seing, seemingly simple tasks
such as detecting login anomalies can be dicult when one has to
wrestle with 450 billion login events yearly.
ere are other problems besides scalability. Firstly, the cloud
environment is constantly shiing: virtual machines are constantly
deployed and decommissioned based on demand and usage; devel-
opers continuously push out code to support new features which
inherently changes the data distributions, and the assumptions
made during model building. Secondly, each backend service func-
tions dierently. For instance, the backend service that orchestrates
Azure’s storage solution is architected dierently from the backend
service that allocates computation power. Hence, to continue with
the login anomaly example, one must account for dierent architec-
tures, data distributions and analyze each service separately. Fur-
thermore, the cloud, unlike traditional systems, is geo-distributed.
For instance, Azure has 36 data centers across the world, including
China, Europe, and Americas, and hence must respect the privacy
and compliance laws in the individual regions. is poses novel
challenges in operationalizing security data science solutions. For
instance, compliance restrictions that dictate data cannot be ex-
ported from specic geographic locations (a security constraint)
have a downstream eect on model design, deployment, evaluation,
and management strategies (a data science constraint).
is paper focuses on the practical hurdles in building machine
learning systems for intrusion detection systems in a cloud envi-
ronment for securing the backend infrastructure as opposed to
oering frontend security solutions to external customers. Hence,
the alerts produced by the detection systems discussed in this paper
are consumed by in-house, Microso security analysts as opposed
to paying customers who buy Azure services. ough not discussed
in this paper, we would like to highlight that the frontend monitor-
ing solutions built for external customers are considerably dierent
from backend solutions, as the threat landscape diers based on
the customer’s cloud oering selection. For instance, if a customer
chooses IaaS, important security tasks such as rewall congura-
tion, patching, and management is the customer’s responsibility
ar
X
iv
:1
70
9.
07
09
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
0 S
ep
 20
17
as opposed to PaaS, where most of the security tasks are the cloud
provider’s responsibility. In practice, the dierence between PaaS
and IaaS dictates dierent security monitoring solutions.
is paper is not about fraud, malware, spam, specic algorithms
or techniques. Instead, we share several open questions related to
model compliance, generating aack data for model training, siloed
detections, and automation for aack disruption - all in the context
of monitoring internal cloud infrastructure.
We begin with a discussion about building models (or systems)
that distinguish between statistical anomalies and security-interesting
events using domain knowledge. is is followed by a discussion
of techniques for evaluating security detections. We then describe
issues surrounding model deployment, such as privacy and local-
ization, and present some approaches to address these issues. We
move on to discuss issues with siloed data and models. We conclude
with some ways to move from aack detection to aack disruption.
2 EVOLUTION TO SECURITY INTERESTING
ALERTS
Here is a typical industry scenario: An organization invests in
log collection and monitoring systems, then hires data scientists
to build advanced security detections only to nd that the team
of security analysts are unhappy with the results. Disgruntled
analysts are not the only thing at stake here: a recent study by
the Ponemon Institute [18], showed that organizations spend, on
average, nearly 21,000 hours each year analyzing false positive
security alerts, wasting roughly $1.3 million yearly. To address this
issue, it can be appealing to invest in a more complex algorithm that
presumably can reduce the false positive rate and surface beer
anomalies. However, as we describe below, blind adherence to this
strategy tends not to yield the desired results.
As mentioned earlier, Azure has more than hundreds of backend
services that are all architected dierently. On the one hand, it is
impossible to have a single generic anomaly detection that captures
the nuances of each service. On the other hand, it is cumbersome
to build bespoke machine learning detections for each service. In
this section, we describe strategies to combine the regular anomaly
detection seing with domain knowledge from the service and
security experts in the form of rules to lower false positive rates.
We have established the following criteria for security alerts to
help maximize their usefulness to security analysts: Explainable,
Credible, and Actionable. Unfortunately, anomaly detection in
an industry seing rarely satises these criteria. is is because
anomalous events are present in any organization, but not all of
these anomalies are “security interesting” which is what the security
analysts care about.
As an example, we encountered the following issue when build-
ing an anomalous executable detection. We collaborated with our
security investigation team to beer understand how aackers mas-
querade their tools to match common executables. For instance,
aackers would name their tool “ccalc.exe” to be deceptively similar
to the Microso Windows Calculator program “calc.exe”. We sought
to develop an anomaly detection for nding abnormal executables
based on the executable name and metadata.
When we ran this new detection, security experts found most of
the alerts were false positives despite conforming to their denition
Figure 1: A Venn diagram depicting the intersection of secu-
rity interesting alerts
of aacker activity. For instance, the detection system found an
executable named psping.exe that closely resembles ping.exe, but
the investigation team found that the service engineers were using
a popular system utility tool. is soon became a recurring theme:
the alert appeared worthy of investigation at rst glance, but aer
spending considerable resources on the investigation, we would
conclude that the alert was a false positive.
In order to generate useful results, we moved away from simply
anomaly detection and focused our eorts on systems that produce
“security interesting” alerts. We dene such a system as one that
captures an adversary’s tools, tactics and procedures from the gath-
ered event data while ignoring expected activity. We show later
in the section, how rules and domain knowledge can help in these
aspects.
As a rst step, we recommend that machine learning engineers
consult with security domain experts to see if there is any overlap
between the aacker activity that we seek to detect and expected
activity. If there is some overlap, then this is a “hygiene” issue and
must be addressed. For instance, aackers oen elevate privileges
using “Run as Administrator” functionality when compromising
infrastructure machines, which can be tracked easily in security
event logs. It is standard operating procedure that service engi-
neers must never elevate to admin privileges without requesting
elevated privileges through a just-in-time access system. is way,
the service engineer’s high privileged activity is monitored and
more importantly, is scoped for a short period of time. However,
service engineers oen disregard this rule when they are debugging.
is creates a problem in which regular service engineer activity
is almost indistinguishable from aacker activity which we refer
to this as “poor hygiene” (see Figure 1). Specifying and strictly
enforcing operating procedures to correct poor hygiene, is the rst
step in reducing the false positive rate of the system.
Once the hygiene issues are resolved and a well-dened secu-
rity scenario is in place, the stage is set for incorporating domain
knowledge.
Figure 2: Sophistication of anomaly detection techniques
2.1 Strategies to incorporate Domain
Knowledge
Domain knowledge is critical when developing security detections,
and how it is leveraged goes well beyond simple feature engineering.
In this section, we discuss the dierent strategies that we have
successfully employed to utilize domain knowledge in the form of
rules. Other ways to incorporate domain knowledge, not discussed
in this paper, are feedback of alerts from security analysts and
consuming threat models.
2.1.1 Incorporating Rules (end consumer + security experts). Rules
are an aractive means to incorporate domain knowledge for the
following reasons:
• ey are a direct embodiment of domain knowledge - Most
organizations have a corpus of rewall rules (e.g., limiting
trac from Remote Desktop Protocol ports), Web Aack
detection rules (e.g., detecting xp cmdshell in SQL logs is
a strong evidence of compromise), or even direct embodi-
ment of the goodness (like whitelists) and maliciousness
(such as blacklists). Security analysts embrace rules be-
cause it allows them to easily express their domain knowl-
edge in simple conditionals. If we dene rules as an atomic
rst-order logic statements, then we can expand to a wider
set:
– Indicators of Compromise (le hashes, network con-
nections, registry key values, specic user agent strings)
that are commonly sourced from commercial vendors;
– reat intelligence feeds (domain reputation, IP repu-
tation, le reputation, application reputation);
– Evidence/telemetry generated by adversary tools, tac-
tics, and procedures that have been observed before-
hand.
• Rules have the highest precision - Every time a scoped rule
res, it is malicious by construction.
Figure 3: Rules can be applied as lters aer the machine
learning system. e machine learning system produces
anomalies, and the business heuristics help to winnow the
security interesting alerts.
• Rules have the highest recall - Whenever a scoped rule
res, it detects all known instances of maliciousness that
are observed for that rule.
We also acknowledge the biggest disadvantage of rules: care
must be taken to maintain the corpus of rules since stale ones
can spike the false positive rate. However, even machine learning
models require babysiing and have their own complications [25].
For instance, if we use a model that has been trained on data that
no longer reects the state environment, the model can dri and
produce unexpected results. Given that rules encode domain knowl-
edge, are readily available, and favored by security analysts, we
present three strategies to incorporate them alongside a machine
learning system.
As lters. Rules not only catch known malicious activity, but
can also be applied as lters on the output of the machine learning
system to si out the expected activity (see Figure 3). In this archi-
tecture, the machine learning system produces anomalies, and the
rules/business heuristics help to pick out the security interesting
alerts. We used this framework to detect logins from unusual ge-
ographic locations. In this scenario, if a user who always logs in
from New York aempts to login from Sydney, then the user must
be prompted for multifactor authentication. Our initial implemen-
tation of the detection logic had a false positive rate of 28%, and at
cloud scale, that translated to 280 million “suspicious” logins. To
improve our false positive rate, we supplemented the system with
custom rules to identify company proxies, cellphone networks, and
possible vacations/travel. Aer applying such business heuristics,
the false positive rate dropped to less than 0.001% which demon-
strate how eective rules can act as lters.
As binary features. Rules can also be easily incorporated within
machine learning systems as binary features (see Figure 4), and is
used in our network anomaly detection. For instance, if the rule is
TRUE on the event data, it is set to 1, and 0 otherwise. is kind
of construction is useful when the rules are explicit and change
slowly, such as rewall rules or web aack detection, as opposed
to temporary ones (e.g., “Bob is on vacation from 8/1 to 8/20”).
Within ML system. Unlike the rst two constructions where the
corpus of rules was separate from the machine learning system, it is
also possible to encapsulate the rules and machine learning system
as one entity (see Figure 5). e biggest advantage is that when this
embodiment is used, there is no need to maintain two separate code
bases (code base for machine learning + code base for lters vs. code
base for machine learning + code base for rules vs code base for
Figure 4: Rules can also be used as input to a machine learning system, for example, as binary features.
Figure 5: Representations such as Markov Logic Nets and
Probabilistic So Logic help to combine rules and probabilis-
tic representations as one ML entity.
purely machine learning system). Security scenario formalizations
in terms of Markov logic networks [23] and probabilistic so logic
[16] allow us to combine rst order logic (in our case rules) and
probabilistic graphs. In our experience, the biggest drawbacks with
these systems is that the amount of time for inference quickly
becomes untenable for large scale cloud services. We leave it as
future work to explore the applicability of systems such as Markov
logic networks to the security data science community.
3 MODEL EVALUATION
In the race to build successful security analytics, an inordinate
amount of aention has been paid to selecting the most appropriate
algorithms. However, the challenge is not model building, but con-
vincing end-consumers such as security analysts or on-call service
engineers that the system works. is is a rather dicult task in
practice, owing to a paucity of labeled data and more importantly,
a lack of baseline datasets for the intrusion detection problem in
the cloud space.
Consider some of the popular benchmark data sets: ImageNet
[5] dataset oers 14 million labeled images for image recognition
problems; the SwitchBoard corpus [9] oers close to 5,800 min-
utes of labelled data for speech recognition problems. Security
applications, on the other hand, have outmoded datasets - the last
relevant data set goes back to the 1999 KDD data set [4] on network
intrusions from an articially created network by MIT Lincoln
Laboratory.
However, for the cloud seing there are no prevalent bench-
marks, and we argue that such benchmarks may never exist for the
following reasons:
• Simulated environments with articially created aacks
represent a static, sterile seing that is hardly the case in
practice. In a cloud seing, for instance, VMs are contin-
uously being provisioned and decommissioned; deploy-
ments happen erratically, and the underlying environment
is constantly shiing.
• Aacks in the real-world leave very few traces in most
common sources of telemetry (e.g., the windows security
event log), which can be as low as two entries in the logs
of interest. is is too small a sample of labeled data to
measure against.
• One benet of a benchmark data set such as MNIST is that
we can make a closed-world assumption about the data.
Everything that we need to know about our data is con-
tained entirely within the image itself, with the addition
of a simple label. In a security seing, we can rarely make
a closed-world assumption, as with image recognition sys-
tems. For example, the audit logs from an authentication
service might not tell the complete story about suspicious
activities it, in-part, captures.
• Unlike images where the underlying data is always pixels,
log data is extremely specic to the organization. While
there is some standardization such as NetFlow, the logs
from dierent environments tend to have few similarities,
and more importantly have dierent assumptions. ere-
fore, training or testing on another company’s logs would
be less eective.
• Unless it is a “threat intelligence” company selling scoped
tainted data as indicators of compromise, there is no incen-
tive for a compromised cloud company to share their raw
logs of tainted data to the public, as it may invite further
scrutiny.
For these reasons, security data scientists must create their own
baseline datasets. In this section, we will discuss the dierent
strategies that we use in practice to evaluate detection systems.
ere are two steps:
• Use security knowledge to bootstrap the intrusion detec-
tion system to provide a starting point of aack data
• Use machine learning techniques to grow this seed of la-
beled data
3.1 Bootstrapping using security strategies
For the bootstrap step, we present three strategies with each strat-
egy mapping to dierent maturity levels of the detection lifecycle.
For instance, at the beginning stages of developing detection sys-
tems, we can run a quick test by injecting synthetic data to check if
the system is operational. Once the system has become acceptably
mature, we can use a red team.
3.1.1 Trivial case: Inject fake malicious data into data storage.
e idea here is to create fabricated aacker activity, and test it
against the detection system. We can validate that the system works
as intended if it can surface the injected data among the rest of the
non-anomalous data. While this may seem trivial, we regularly use
it as a test to see if the system is functioning. For instance, when
the Oce 365 security team built a Markov chain model (MCM) to
detect unusual operating system activity, they had no test data to
verify if the system worked as intended. So, they simply created an
account, “eviluser”, and associated it with arbitrary activity. ey
knew their system was functioning as intended if “eviluser” would
rank on top of the alert stack. In some ways, this became a poor
man’s debugger. Of course, with such low overhead comes a huge
tradeo: the injected data may not be representative of true aacker
activity. It is important to note that we do not espouse validating or
generating evaluation data from seemingly random data. Instead,
we are aesting how synthetic data can act as sanity checks to test
detection systems.
3.1.2 Cross Pollinate from security products. A more advanced
strategy for gathering evaluation data is to utilize existing security
products and aacker tools. Here are some strategies we employ:
• Use common aack tools: If the task at hand is to detect
malicious processes running in the OS, engineers can run
tools like Metasploit [19], PowerSploit [21], or Veil [30]in
the environment, and look for traces in the logs. is
technique is similar to using fuzzers for web detection.
While easy to implement, care must be taken not to modify
the model based on this data. is way, we avoid overing
to the tool instead of generalizing to real-world aacks.
• Data from existing security products: If an organization
has parallel security products, they all are potential for new
label data. For instance, when we wanted to test our de-
tection for compromised VMs in our cloud infrastructure,
we leveraged our online mail service for labels of compro-
mised data. Specically, we used our mail service which
indicated the IP addresses that sent spam. For those IP
addresses that stem from our own cloud service, we were
able to track down the VMs. Since these VMs were sending
out spam, we assumed they were compromised and used
their logs to evaluate our detection. e more diverse an
organization’s security product line is, the easier it is to
leverage data for evaluation.
• Honeypots: If it is not possible to acquire data from ex-
isting security products, then honeypots can be deployed.
When aackers ultimately compromise honeypots, logs
from these systems can be used for evaluation. ere are
two drawbacks to this strategy:
– Not all aacks can be captured via honeypots. For
instance, we see a preponderance of network recon-
naissance (such as ping, and checking for open SSH
ports) as opposed to more arcane aacks such as hy-
pervisor escapes.
– ere is no guarantee that aackers will be lured by
the honeypot, and hence no guarantee that we will
receive any evaluation data. In other words, we will
only be able to collect data for opportunistic aacks
and not targeted ones.
3.1.3 Test against red team. e highest quality evaluation data
is generated when we hold penetration test engagements in which
authorized engineers play the role of an adversary (commonly called
“red team”) and aempt to accomplish their goals while subverting
our detection system. Red team members emulate adversaries with
specic objectives, like exltrating data and begin from scratch
with reconnaissance. Results from red teaming are the best approx-
imations to how our systems are aacked “in the wild” and make
a great way to validate detection systems. ere are some caveats
to using red teams: rstly, red teams are expensive resources, and
in most cases, only large organizations have in-house red teams.
Secondly, it is important to note that red team engagements are
point-in-time exercises that are typically scheduled once every four
months whereas security analyst teams are constantly building new
detections based on the currents threats. Finally, evaluating the
detection system aer a red team engagement is not trivial. For
instance, even when red team members take meticulous notes dur-
ing the process, identifying the malicious sessions is an extremely
time-consuming task. For example, their logs might read “ran tool
X” with a timestamp. However, security analysts would need to
spend an inordinate amount of time mapping back to identify the
aack data in the logs.
3.2 Machine learning for increasing attack data
It is important to note that data produced by the red team or cross-
pollination is not sucient by itself for model evaluation. For in-
stance, the data generated by red team activities is limited because
the engagement is scoped: red teams tend to compromise only a
handful of accounts (in the order of tens as opposed to thousands)
that are required to achieve their objective. ese precise move-
ments leave very few traces in logs. To tackle this problem, in this
section, we describe how to employ machine learning techniques
to increase our aack data corpus.
It is not good strategy in practice to undersample the majority
class (i.e., the “normal”, non-malicious data) as it is tantamount to
throwing away data - the model never sees some of the normal
data, which may encode important information. On the other hand,
naively oversampling the minority classes (i.e., the generated aack
data) has the disadvantage of repeating the same observed varia-
tions - we are not increasing the data set; we are merely replicating
it. Instead, we recommend SMOTE [2]. Essentially, it generates
a random point along the line segment connecting an anomalous
point, or “aack point”, to its nearest neighbor. In our experience,
SMOTE outperforms weighted decision trees.
Recent developments in Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN)
[10] suggest they are a promising vehicle for increasing aack cor-
pus. Results from [11, 13] show that GANs can produce adversarial
examples that successfully trick the intrusion detection system. We
posit that these same techniques can be used to synthesize aack
data for evaluation. ere are only two perceived drawbacks: the
bootstrap dataset must be suciently large (while this may be easy
in the case of malware analysis, it is going to be dicult to get
many examples of insider aacks for intrusion detection). We have
also found that GANs are particularly tricky to train.
4 MODEL EXPLAINABILITY
For any practical application of machine learning to security, there
is no perfect model. We must accept that security signals will be
wrong sometimes; security analysts are well-aware of this fact.
In a cloud seing where there can be thousands of alerts, model
explainability becomes a major issue. For example, it is not sucient
to say there was an unusual .exe le that executed on the system.
e alert must convey why the .exe le was anomalous - perhaps it
ran from tmp folder; perhaps it took base-64 encoded inputs (which
aackers always do); perhaps the .exe le stemmed from a browser,
right aer downloading a .pdf document. Giving security analysts
such explanations is instrumental in eliciting actions.
When creating new security signals, we must consider that the
alerts generated by the signal should be explainable. e earlier
this is taken into account during the signal development process,
the beer. Many common and otherwise useful techniques do not
easily facilitate explaining the results they produce.
For example, Deep Learning produces good results in many ap-
plications, but it can be dicult to explain why the model produced
the results that it did. On the other hand, the output of a simple
linear model can oen be explained in terms of the coecients.
e explanations provided can come in dierent forms. e most
obvious, at least from a machine learning perspective, is to provide
one or more features of the model that most impacted the score.
at is, we can provide the features that “caused” the model to
score the event as suspicious. is does not need to be a statistically
sound explanation. Interaction eects among features can cause
us to provide many features as explanations, but this only creates
more information overload for the analyst. Instead, we should treat
the explanation as breadcrumbs that can lead the analyst on the
right path.
Some other ways in which we can help explain the results of
a security signal are to provide supplemental data to the output
and to provide a textual description. Supplemental data can be
something as simple as a ranked order of the suspicious executables
on a machine, that can possibly help explain a signal’s output or,
at least, put it in a context that helps the analyst make sense of
the output. A textual description is not always straight-forward,
but simplies the need to further interpret the explanation. For
example, a suspicious login signal might provide an explanation
such as “high speed of travel to an unfamiliar location”. is can
be much more meaningful that having the analyst look at a set of
real-valued features to draw the same conclusion.
Although the output produced by some machine learning models
is not easily explained, there have nonetheless been some aempts
at providing some explanations. Among these are techniques such
as Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME) [22].
5 MODEL COMPLIANCE AND
LOCALIZATION
Most cloud services have data centers across the world - Azure, for
instance, has 36 data centers spread across every continent except
Antarctica. In this section, we explore how compliance laws across
the world aect building security data science solutions space along
with a closely related problem of localization.
Building models that are respectful of compliance laws is im-
portant because failure to do so not only brings with it crippling
monetary costs - for instance, failure to adhere to the new European
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) set to take eect on
May 2018, can result in a ne up to 20 Million Euros or 4% of annual
global turnover [1] - but also the negative press associated for the
business. However, building privacy compliant models presents
three challenges:
• Data protection laws are not uniform across the world. For
instance, in the European Union, Article 29 of the Data
Protection Working PARTY [3] unequivocally considers
“IP addresses as data relating to an identiable person”,
whereas in the United States, IP address by itself is not per-
sonally identiable and United States courts have opined
that “IP address identies a computer not a person” [15].
Since we want to be able to glean as much information
as possible, we would need to follow dierent masking
procedures in dierent regions which complicates model
building and model deployment.
• Data protection laws ask for retroactive modication. To
use GDPR as a running example, Article 17 requires right
to erasure or commonly called “Right to be forgoen”,
wherein companies must delete records pertaining to a
person, when asked. is brings a lot of challenges to the
Figure 6: Shotgun deployment places same model code
across dierent regions. ere are two disadvantages: e
model may not be appropriate for a particular region. Also,
there is no communication between models.
security seing. Consider the simple case of building a sys-
tem that computes user risk based on user activity. One of
the common techniques to evaluate risk score is “guilty by
association” wherein a user’s risk score is increased if the
user communicates with other compromised or suspicious
users. In other words, user risk score is modeled jointly
with other users and not in isolation. Now, because of right
to be forgoen, if a user’s details are deleted, should the
user’s risk score that was used as input to calculate other
risk score also change? How do we make models elastic to
retroactively delete results and yet remain logically consis-
tent? is would be a good question to explore for future
research.
• Privacy laws change with the political landscape - for in-
stance, it is not clear how Britain leaving the European
Union would aect the privacy laws in the country.
Closely related to model compliance is model localization. For
instance, we built a login anomaly detection using seasonality to
detect anomalous login during “o hours” (common wisdom stating
that anyone logging at midnight on a weekend to access conden-
tial material, is anomalous). However, this naı¨ve system quickly
backred - timestamps were normalized to GMT standard, and
converting to local time was not possible because there was no IP
address, owing to privacy reasons, for reverse geo mapping. Also,
in a global company, the denition of a weekend is labile - weekend
in the Middle East is not the same as weekend in the Americas. An-
other complication was that because product adoption happens at
dierent rates across the world, the data generated by each region
is dierent. is is because the data distribution from a mature
market is very dierent that of an emerging market, and hence
dictates dierent models.
Should there be no model compliance and model localization
problems, one can simply use “shotgun deployment”, i.e., deploy
the same model code across dierent regions (see Figure 6). With
Figure 7: Tiered Modeling: Each region is modeled sepa-
rately. Results are scrubbed according to compliance laws
and privacy agreements. Scrubbed results are used as input
to “Model Prime”, where they are collated for global trends.
this comes deployment ease as there is no customization and from
an operational and debugging perspective, our support sta are
happy because there was only one troubleshooting guide to debug
any failure. However, because the same model template is used, we
are forced to make the erroneous that the data distribution is same
across the world.
For capturing global trends, we propose “tiered modeling” -
wherein each geographic region is modeled separately using be-
spoke models which then send the scrubbed results to a central
“model-prime” (see Figure 7). e “model-prime” reasons over the
output of the individual regions to centralize for global trends. is
architecture has two advantages: by having models that run in
the context of a region, it is easier to respect local privacy laws
and account for nuances of the region; at the same time, having a
model-prime accounts for global trends. is comes at a cost: in
our experience, this architecture requires specialized deployment
frameworks and code maintenance or instance, code change in one
region, most likely requires retraining of model-prime.
is idea of tiered modeling is built on the idea of dierential
privacy [7] and is similar to the work on applying dierential pri-
vacy in an ensemble seing [12], with the main exceptions: tiered
modeling is an ensemble of dierent kinds of learners as opposed to
a single type of learner (to ensure that the compliance and localiza-
tion complexities in dierent regions, may require dierent types
of learners). We leave it as future work to study the theoretical
guarantees of tiered modeling.
6 HORIZONTALLY AND VERTICALLY SILOED
APPROACHES
In addition to the problems surrounding anomaly detection, model
evaluation, and compliance, we are also faced with complicating
factors derived from data silos. ese data silos make it dicult
to build security detections across various data sets due to access
boundary restrictions. In this section, we describe two types of
data siloes, referred to here as horizontal and vertical siloes, and
present some of the problems encountered with each type.
Access to data required to create and run new security signals
is oen restricted due to privacy concerns, among other reasons.
is leads to horizontally siloed detections. In a system like Azure
where there are hundreds of dierent services, aacks can span
multiple services. For example, an aacker might rst compromise
the service responsible for authentication and then proceed to the
service that controls storage. In this case, it is ineective to build
security signals that might protect a single service but have no
visibility into other services.
ere has been some success applying signal fusion techniques
to the problem of horizontally siloed signals. We can take various
signals from dierent services that are otherwise siloed, then apply
a signal fusion algorithm to combine their outputs. For example,
the outputs of many signals can form features in a simple linear
model, or we can leverage ensemble machine learning to combine
the individual signals (see [6] for an overview of such techniques).
Vertically siloed detections present a unique set of challenges.
When creating a new security detection, we must decide what is the
appropriate level of abstraction that is needed to reliably detect the
security events of interest. As an example, determining if a process
is being exploited for an in-memory malware requires a low-level
of abstraction since we must look for suspicious memory allocation
and suspicious DLL loading. On the other hand, detecting unusual
logins for accounts generally requires a higher-level of abstraction
so we can monitor suspicious login locations and suspicious “impos-
sible travel” logins. ese types of abstractions are oen necessary
and sucient for the intended scenarios. However, the dierent
levels of abstractions can obfuscate event data that can dierentiate
a benign event from a malicious event.
Consider a sequence of actions taken on a cloud storage ser-
vice. We might have events with actions such as FileOpened, FileU-
ploaded, and FileDeleted. ese events might contain supplemental
information such as UserAgent and Timestamp, but there is only
so much that can be used to dierentiate a benign action from a
malicious one at this level of abstraction. e lower level actions
associated with this event can help inform our judgment. For ex-
ample, a password-protected malicious document requires user
input to open, so our higher-level abstraction signals might view
this as benign. In this case, our lower-level signals can inform the
higher-level signals, even if none of the signals can individually
conclude with high condence the exact nature of the event.
is issue of vertically siloed detections is not simply a conse-
quence of data access boundaries. It is primarily a consequence
of a lack of ability to reason across these abstraction levels. Un-
fortunately, it is deceptively challenging to reason across these
abstraction levels. We cannot simply apply a signal fusion algo-
rithm as with horizontally siloed signals. is is because the very
nature of abstraction means that signals built at a higher level of
abstraction are aected by data captured at a lower level of abstrac-
tion. is can create a sort of redundancy in which, essentially,
the same thing is being measured more than once. e eect is
that the wrong things can be reinforced while the right things are
overlooked.
ere are many complicating factors with combining the results
of vertically siloed detections, and they are not always obvious in a
cloud environment with a large number of services. Some of these
problems have been addressed in related problem seings [25] but
there is still opportunity for substantial progress to be made here.
7 WAY FORWARD: ATTACK DETECTION TO
ATTACK DISRUPTION
While we continue to bolster our detection systems for the cloud,
we would like to draw the aention of the security data science
community to what we think is the next wave of advancements in
this eld.
We begin with revisiting the adversary’s kill chain [14], which
details the most common sequence of steps an aacker follows in
an industrial seing. It describes how an aacker rst performs
reconnaissance, delivers malware (most commonly via phishing)
to establish foothold; establishes persistence by installing rootkits.
From here on, the adversary moves from machine to machine in
search of the goal. Once the aacker nds the goal, he or she
elevates to administrator privileges and, in most seings, exltrates
the data of interest.
Aer carefully analyzing several security breaches, and inter-
viewing internal security analysts (the “blue team”), we discovered
that blue teams execute their own steps to evict the adversary from
the environment which runs parallel to the adversary kill chain.
Specically, blue team members perform the following steps:
• Detect the evidence as an indication of compromise
• Alert the appropriate security team
• Triage the alert to determine whether it warrants further
investigation
• Gather context from the environment to scope the breach
• Form a remediation plan to contain or evict the adversary
• Execute the remediation plan
is formulation is pertinent because industry reports [31] show
that “compromises are measured in minutes 98% of the time” whereas
mean time to detect breaches is in the order of months or longer.
While we must detect that an aack has happened - even if it’s long
aer exltration has nished - the only strategy that is of value to
the business is aack disruption. If we were to use the analogy of a
building on re, the blue team needs to transition from the role of
an arson investigator and to that of a reghter.
ere is more to aack disruption than a pressing need to act
faster via automation (such as “automatic incident response”, “auto-
matic remediation”). Is there a place for intelligence across the blue
team kill chain - specically, is there a place for machine learning
to achieve this goal of aack disruption? For instance, can natural
language processing and chatbots help analysts in triaging alerts;
can recommender engines recommend the next steps in investiga-
tions based on previous experiences? Are the techniques used in
network trac optimization transferable for remediation so that
Figure 8: Kill chains
Figure 9: Kill chain attack disruption
trac from tainted servers is appropriately sinkholed? Applying
machine learning to aack disruption has many open questions,
and we urge the security data science community to think about
this space.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we described the diculties in building intrusion
detection systems for the cloud. We have claimed that conventional
anomaly detection, by itself, does not produce useful alerts in a
cloud seing. In practice, we nd that a hybrid approach of rules
and machine learning yields beer results, and showed how they
can be combined in the form of lters, features, or even as one
single machine learning unit. Since there is no benchmark for
evaluating cloud intrusion detection systems, we outlined strategies
for gathering high quality evaluation data using other security
products or red teams (recommended) and grow the dataset using
SMOTE or possibly GANs. We oered our experience in model
explainability, and demonstrate how it is more important than ever.
Because of the geo-distributed and global nature of the cloud, we
must then deal with model compliance, localization, and data silo
issues that aect model design and development. Finally, we shared
a framework for aack disruption as the way forward and look to
the security data science community for intelligent automation of
the blue team kill chain.
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